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ABSTRACT 
Determinants of default risk of banks in emerging economies have so far 
received inadequate attention in the literature. Using panel data techniques, this 
paper seeks to study the determinants bank asset quality and profitability using 
robust data sets for the period from 1997-2009. The findings of the study reveal 
some interesting inferences contrary to the established perceptions. Priority 
sector credit has been found to be not significant in affecting the NPAs contrary 
to the general perception and similar is the case with that of rural branches 
implying that aversion to rural credit is a falsely founded perception. Bad Debts 
are dependent more on the performance of the industry than other sectors of the 
economy. Public sector banks have shown significant performance in containing 
bad debts private banks have continued to be stable in containing the bad debts as 
they have better risk management procedures and technology, which definitely 
allows them to finish up with lower levels of NPAs. Further, investigating the 
effect of determinants on profitability it is established that while capital adequacy 
and investment activity significantly affect the profitability of commercial banks 
apart from other accepted determinants of profitability, asset size has no 
significant impact on profitability. 
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Determinants of Bank Asset Quality and Profitability 
- An Empirical Assessment  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial stability in an economy is largely dependent on the stability and the resilience 
of the banking system. To accomplish banking stability the banks are required to maintain 
quality bank assets that aid in achieving profitability. The failure to ensure banking stability can 
cause financial fragility and may lead to crisis scenarios in the event of market illiquidity and or 
bank contagion. The significance of banking stability can be better understood in the backdrop of 
the global financial crisis of 2008 that resulted in the collapse of financial markets and 
institutions. Moreover, output per capita is projected to slide down in countries representing 
three-quarters of the global economy. The consequent deterioration in the economic environment 
has led to a rise in the overall level of stress in the banking sectors. Commercial bank loan 
charge-offs in the US and Europe may exceed the levels reached during the 1991–1992 
recession, even though they should remain below the levels experienced in the US during the 
Great Depression.  
 
On a thorough analysis of the crisis, financial stability has once again emerged as an 
important area of concern in the financial systems across the globe. Financial stability is widely 
accepted as a situation in which financial system is capable of satisfactorily performing its three 
key functions simultaneously, viz; (1) efficient and smooth facilitation of the inter-temporal 
allocation of resources from the surplus economic units to the deficit economic units, (2) 
managing the forward looking financial risks with appropriate pricing and (3) to be prepared all 
the time to absorb the financial and real economic surprises and shocks. Counterparty risk being 
an important risk in the financial system more particularly in the banking system, poses a bigger 
challenge in order to achieve financial stability. Counter-party risk is an outcome directly related 
to the Non-Performing Assets
1
 [NPAs] of a financial institution. Even though NPAs are 
                                                          
1
 Loans that the bank foresees it will have difficulty in collecting. They include nonaccrual loans, reduced rate loans, 
renegotiated loans, and loans past due 90 days or more. They exclude assets acquired in foreclosures and 
repossessed personal property. NPAs mainly arise due to the default of the borrower, which involves his inability or 
unwillingness in meeting the commitments to the loan. Non-performing assets (NPAs) or bad loans, as they are 
commonly called, have been a menace for the banking sector across the world.  
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permanent phenomenon in the balance sheets of the financial institutions, if not contained 
properly, they eventually lead to crisis, which can pose big threats of contagion that can engulf 
the financial health of the system.  
 
The issue of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) has gained growing attention in the last few 
decades in view of the established fact that the immediate consequence of bubbling up of NPAs 
in the banking system is bank failure. Many researches like; Demirguc-Kunt (1989) and Barr and 
Siems (1994) have established that asset quality is a statistically significant predictor of 
insolvency for the cause of bank failures and the failing banking institutions always have high 
level of non-performing loans prior to failure. Further, the problem of NPAs has become 
synonymous to functional efficiency of financial intermediaries and believed to be the major 
causes of the economic stagnation problems. As per the Global Financial Stability Report of 
International Monetary Fund, (IMF, 2009), identifying and dealing with distressed assets, and 
recapitalizing weak but viable institutions and resolving failed institutions are stated as the two 
of the three important priorities which directly relate to NPAs.  It is obvious to note that better 
asset quality aids improvement in profitability. In order to improve profitability, it is imperative 
on the banks to manage their asset quality as well as determinants of profitability. The growing 
incidence of poor bank asset quality calls for a renewed look at the factors that impact on the 
performance of the banks in terms of both profitability and asset management. 
 
           Only few studies of citable significance have dealt on the problems of NPAs particularly 
in the context of developing economies like Indian banking mainly because of the the lack of 
sufficient published, disaggregated information on the micro-management of NPAs and the 
nature and type of default. Though, Indian banking has not experienced notable banking crises 
when compared to the other countries in the world, the issues concerning NPAs have come up 
particularly in view of the comparatively high levels of NPAs of Indian commercial banks vis-à-
vis the other countries. These kind of economies which have not suffered banking crises but still 
continue face the problem of  mounting NPAs offer a sound logic to undertake an empirical 
examination conjoining the profitability analysis as well. This study sets out specific questions 
such as; (i) What are the significant determinants that influence the NPAs of commercial banks 
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and to what extent? (ii) What factors affect bank profitability in a banking system that is quite 
different from that of the crises ridden advanced banking systems? (iii) What lessons 
(particularly in the domain of macro-economic management and prudential regulation) can be 
drawn from the dynamics in the banking systems like that of India particularly in the context of 
bank asset quality and profitability. In view of this, it is essential to identify and understand the 
determinants (both macro-economic and industry specific) of NPAs. Further, this study is aimed 
at a comprehensive empirical analysis of the determinants of bank asset quality and profitability 
in the context of Indian banking and contributes to the growing literature on bank asset quality 
management and profitability and to suggest some measures to counter the rising NPAs.  
 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. While Section II provides theoretical 
considerations drawn from an exhaustive survey of contemporary literature available on the 
topic, Section III and IV illustrate the macro-economic determinants and endogenous 
determinants of the study. Section V presents a brief discussion on the asset quality in Indian 
commercial banks. While empirical specification and estimation of the study is captured in 
Section VI, the discussion on the results is presented in Section VII. Finally, the summary and 
conclusion of the study is presented Section VIII. 
 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The critical role of financial and banking development in economic growth in any 
economy has been established by many researchers (Levine, 2004 and Singh, 2005). In the 
process of providing credit assistance to the investment activities and projects in the economy, 
the financial institutions face inherent risks in the form of default risk that results in the form of 
Non-Performing Assets that have a negative effect on the profitability of the financial 
institutions. Typically, a credit transaction involves a contract between two parties: the borrower 
and the creditor (bank) subject to a mutual agreement on the ‘terms of credit’2. Optimising 
decision pertaining to the terms of credit could differ from the borrower to that of the creditor. 
As such, the mutual agreement between the borrower and the creditor may not necessarily imply 
                                                          
2
 The ‘terms of credit’ are defined over five critical parameters; viz, amount of credit, interest rate, maturity of loans, 
frequency of loan servicing and collateral. 
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an optimal configuration for both. The most important reason for ‘default’3 could be mismatch 
between ‘borrower’s terms of credit’ and ‘creditor’s terms of credit’. However, a common 
perspective is that both the cases of ‘defaulter’ and ‘non-performer’ imply similar financial 
implications, i.e., financial loss to banks. Moreover, regulatory and supervisory process does not 
focus on such a distinction between defaulter and non-performer as far as prudential norms are 
concerned. 
Table-1: NPA levels and CRAR of Developing & Advanced Countries 
Country CRAR NPA/TL 
 2002 2006 2007 2008 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Developing Economies 
China - - 8.4 8.2 26 7.5 6.7 2.5 
India 12 12.4 12.3 13 10.4 3.5 2.5 2.3 
Indonesia 20.1 21.3 19.3 16.8 24 13.1 4.1 3.5 
Korea 11.2 12.8 12.3 10.9 2.4 0.8 0.7 1.1 
South Africa 12.6 12.3 12.8 12.5 2.8 1.2 1.4 2.6 
Advanced Economies 
Australia 9.6 10.4 10.2 10.9 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.5 
Canada 12.4 12.5 12.1 12.7 1.6 0.4 0.7 1.1 
France 11.5 - 10.1 - 4.2 3.2 2.7 - 
Germany 12.7 - 12.9 - 5 4 2.7 - 
Italy 11.2 10.7 10.4 - 6.5 5.3 4.6 - 
Japan 9.4 13.1 12.9 12.3 7.4 2.5 1.5 1.5 
United 
Kingdom 
13.1 12.9 12.6 - 2.6 0.9 0.9 - 
United States 13 13 12.8 12.5 1.4 0.8 1.4 2.3 
Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
 
A synoptic review of the literature brings to the fore insights into the determinants of 
NPAs across countries. Quite a lot of economies have experienced such distressed debt cycles. 
NPA levels and Capital to Risk (Weighted) Assets Ratio (CRAR) of Developing & Advanced 
Countries presented in Table-1 and Provisions to NPAs and Return on Assets (ROA) of 
Developing & Advanced Countries captured in Table-2 explain us the differences in the levels as 
well as the approaches towards NPA management in different countries. Bank Regulatory CRAR 
of select countries is captured in Figure-1. In the USA, the non- and sub-performing loans 
                                                          
3
 A ‘default’ entails violation of the loan contract or the agreed terms of the contract, while a non-performing loan 
entails that the borrower does not renege from the loan contract but fails to comply the repayment schedule due to 
evolving unfavourable conditions. 
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resolution was embedded into the savings and loans crisis from 1989 to 1994. In Japan, the NPA 
cycle began in 1997 and China and the rest of Asia deal with NPAs Sub Prime Loans [SPLs] 
since 1999. The origin of the Chinese NPAs crisis can be traced to political issues. During the 
centrally planned economy from 1949 onwards loans were granted by state owned banks to state-
owned companies without proper credit due diligence at predetermined standardised conditions 
by the government. Especially, in the overheated economy of the 1990s domestic credits 
extended enormously and grew by 30 percent year on year between 1992 and 1995 (Chen, 2004; 
Sprayregen et al., 2004).  
Table-2: Provisions to NPAs and ROA of Developing & Advanced Countries 
Country PROVISIONS TO NPAs ROA 
  2002 2006 2007 2008 2002 2006 2007 2008 
Developing Economies 
China  - - 39.2 115.3 - 0.9 1 - 
India  - 58.9 56.1 52.6 0.8 0.9 0.9 1 
Indonesia  130 99.7 87.7 98.5 1.4 2.6 2.8 2.6 
Korea  89.6 175.2 199.1 155.4 0.6 1.1 1.1 - 
South Africa  46 - - - 0.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 
Advanced Economies 
Australia 106.2 204.5 183.7 87.2 1.4 - 1 0.9 
Canada 41.1 55.3 42.1 34.7 0.4 1 0.9 1.3 
France 58.4 58.7 61.4 - 0.5 - 0.4 - 
Germany - - 77.3 - 0.1 0.5 0.2 - 
Italy - 46 49.5 - 0.5 0.8 0.8 - 
Japan - 30.3 26.4 24.9 -0.7 0.4 0.2 0.3 
United 
Kingdom 
75 - - - 0.4 0.5 0.4 - 
United States 123.7 137.2 93.1 84.7 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.3 
 Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
 
A typically high leverage in the country shown by a Debt/Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
ratio of 146 percent may be an indicator for the problem of NPAs (see Ernst & Young, 2001). 
High leverage was experienced in the real estate sector, particularly during the rise of the 
Japanese real estate bubble in the 1980s. With the burst of the bubble in the 1991 and the 
dramatic economic slowdown, real estate values waned tremendously in the case of Japan. As an 
aftermath, borrowers defaulted on the debt service and lenders had to sign big losses. Lacking 
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regulations
4
 and tax incentives by the Japanese Government as well as insufficient equity 
reserves of the banks to compensate write-offs of distressed debt, banks tried to deal with the 
problem by a wait-and-see approach. Barseghyan (2004) identifies a link between the Japanese 
government’s reluctance to solve the bad loan problem and the economic slowdown. He opines 
that the Governments behaviour deteriorated the economic situation of Japan and affirms this 
hypothesis by a normative study.  
Figure-1: Bank Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets 
 
   Source: Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009, IMF. 
 
In the case of Thailand, the causes for NPAs include factors like liberalized capital and 
current account, a legal system that made credit recovery time consuming and difficult, real 
estate speculations, steep rise in interest rates and inability of the banks to assess the credit risk. 
To overcome the problem the Financial Sector Restructuring Plan (1998) focused on capital 
support facilities for bank recapitalization and setting up of Asset Management Corporations 
(Devakula, Pridiyathorn, 2001). Korean causes for distressed loans were like directed credit 
(Kang, Moon-Soo, 2001), the “compressed growth policy” which backfired when slowing 
demand and rising input costs placed severe stress on their profitability, lack of monitoring and 
contagion effects. These issues were attempted to be countered with measures like; Creation of 
the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and a NPA fund to finance the purchase of 
NPAs (Bama, 2002) and Corporate Restructuring Vehicles (CRVs) and Debt/Equity Swaps were 
used to facilitate the resolution of bad loans. 
                                                          
4 The inconsistent regulatory policies and shortsighted macro-economic policies were a prelude to the banking crises in most of 
the Latin American countries. Further, the rapid and uncontrolled expansion of bank lending was found to be the key cause for 
the Scandinavian banking crisis.  
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III. MACRO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF ASSET QUALITY 
Most of the empirical evidence suggests that banks’ NPAs closely linked to the economic 
activity. In other words, macroeconomic factors such as; downturns / slowdowns in the 
economy, recessions, low rate of savings, weak markets, depressions in industrial production, 
reduction in per capita income levels and most importantly the inflation levels in the economy. A 
fair amount of the academic literature has dealt with determinants of banking crisis, which is the 
most severe of the consequences of bad loans in a banking system that is of valuable 
understanding as a backdrop for the study of NPAs
5
. Dermiguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) 
employed a Multivariate Logit Framework to develop an early warning system for banking crisis 
and a ratings system for bank fragility. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2005) examined the 
inter-linkage between bank concentration and banking system fragility where they have 
established that higher bank concentration is associated with lower profitability. Lis, et.al.,(2000) 
have found that Gross Domestic Product growth, bank size and Capital had negative effect on 
NPAs while Loan growth, collateral, net interest margin, debt-equity, market power and 
regulation regime had a positive impact on NPAs.  
 
Resti and Sironi (2001) examined corporate bond recovery rate abducing to bond default 
rate, macroeconomic variables such as GDP and growth rate, amount of bonds outstanding, 
amount of default, return on default bonds, and stock return wherein it was established that 
default rate, amount of bonds, default bonds, and economic recession had negative effect, while 
the GDP growth rate, and stock return had positive effect on corporate recovery rate. Lis, 
et.al.,(2000) used a simultaneous equation model in which they explained bank loan losses in 
Spain using a host of indicators, which included GDP growth rate, debt-equity ratios of firms, 
regulation regime, loan growth, bank branch growth rates, bank size (assets over total size), 
collateral loans, net interest margin, capital-asset ratio (CAR) and market power of default 
companies. They found that GDP growth (contemporaneous, as well as one period lag term), 
bank size, and CAR, had negative effect while loan growth, collateral, net-interest margin, debt-
equity, market power, regulation regime and lagged dependent variable had positive effect on 
                                                          
5
 Non-performing assets is used interchangeably with non-performing loans in this Comment. NPAs are measured 
on either gross basis or on net basis (net of provisions). While the gross NPAs reflects the quality of loans made by 
the banks, net NPAs shows the actual burden of the banks.  
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problem loans. Sergio (1996) in a study of non-performing loans in Italy found evidence that, an 
increase in the riskiness of loan assets is rooted in a bank’s lending policy adducing to relatively 
unselective and inadequate assessment of sectoral prospects. Interestingly, this study refuted that 
business cycle could be a primary reason for banks’ NPAs. The study emphasised that increase 
in bad debts as a consequence of recession alone is not empirically demonstrated. However, 
according to Bloem and Gorter (2001) NPAs may be caused by wrong economic decision or by 
plain bad luck.  
 
Das and Ghosh (2003) established relationship between Non Performing Loans of India’s 
public sector banks in terms of various indicators such as; asset size, credit growth and 
macroeconomic condition and operating efficiency indicators. Bercoff, Giovanniz and Grimardx 
(2002) in their study of Argentinean banks tried to measure NPAs by using the various bank 
related parameters as well as macroeconomic parameters. Bank specific parameters in their study 
were Ratio of Networth to Net Assets, Banks exposure to peso loans, and type of banks such as 
foreign, private or public. Macroeconomic factors in this study were credit growth, reserves 
adequacy, foreign interest rate and monetary expansion. They have established that variables 
such as operating cost, exposure to peso loans, credit growth, and foreign interest rate had a 
negative effect on NPAs. The macroeconomic variables such as money multiplier and reserve 
adequacy had a positive impact on NPAs. Chen et al. (1998) study the relationship between the 
risks and the ownership structure, and it appears that a negative correlation exists between the 
managers’ shareholdings and the risks faced by the financial institution. That means that if the 
managers’ shareholding percentage increases, the financial institution will reduce its own risk 
behavior. While Berger and De Young (1995) mention that a management team with poor 
operating capability is unable to correctly appraise the value of collateral, which means that it is 
difficult for it to follow up on its supervision of the borrower, its poor credit-rating technology 
will result in management being unable to control and supervise the operating expenses 
efficiently, thus leading to a significant increase in NPLs. Wahlen (1994) also points out that 
unexpected changes in the NPL Ratio may indicate that expected future loan losses are relatively 
non-discretionary and negatively related to bank stock returns. Therefore, we have considered 
the various bank groups in Indian Banking based on their ownership structures for the analysis. 
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Ownership pattern can also affect the bad loan levels significantly. In times of downturn, 
the government would often turn to banks for financial resources through policy loans for the 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Projects financed by these policy loans gave rise to growing 
default rates (Huang, 1999). The biased lending behavior of the banks to SOEs is supported by 
other research findings as well (Lu et al., 2001). In case of Taiwanese banks the rate of non-
performing loans decreases as the government, shareholding in bank goes higher up to 63.51 
percent, while thereafter it increases (Hu et al., 2002). Few studies have also indicated a 
relationship between the size of the bank and the level of bad loans. Bank’s sizes are often found 
negatively related to the rate of non-performing loan (Hu et al., 2002). Bodla and Verma (2006) 
have emphasised that financial sector reforms have brought in greater competition among the 
banks and have brought their profitability under pressure. Accordingly, banks are facing a 
number of challenges such as frequent changes in technology required for modern banking, 
stringent prudential norms, increasing competition, worrying level of NPA’s, rising customer 
expectations, increasing pressure on profitability, assets-liability management, liquidity and 
credit risk management, rising operating expenditure, shrinking size of spread and so on. 
However, Singh (2005) argues that globalization of operations and development of new 
technologies are taking place at a rapid pace and this has led to the increase in resource 
productivity, increasing level of deposits, credits and profitability and decrease in NPAs.  
 
 
IV. ENDOGENOUS DETERMINANTS OF ASSET QUALITY 
 
The literature on these issues identifies determinants of banks risk taking that can be 
translated into a tractable empirical specification by measuring the effect of observable variables 
like; capital adequacy, credit growth, operational efficiency, branch spread and others. 
Rajaraman, Bhaumik and Bhatia (1999) have explained the variations in NPAs across the Indian 
banks through differences in operating efficiency, solvency and regional concentration. Again, 
Rajaraman and Vasishstha (2002) in their empirical study have proved that significant bivariate 
relationship exists between NPAs of the public sector banks and the inefficiency problems. Das 
(1999) has contrasted the different efficiency measures of public sector banks by applying data 
envelopment analysis model and concluded that the level of NPAs has significant negative 
relationship with efficiency parameters. Kwan and Eisenbis (1997) have examined the 
relationship between problem loans and bank efficiency by employing Granger-causality 
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technique and found that high level of problem loans cause banks to increase spending on 
monitoring working out and / or selling off these loans and possibly become more diligent in 
administering the portion of their existing loan portfolio that is currently performing.  
 
Ranjan and Dhal (2003) attempted an empirical analysis of the NPAs of Public Sector 
banks in India and probed the response of NPAs to terms of credit, bank size, and 
macroeconomic condition and found that terms of credit have significant effect on the banks’ 
Non Performing Assets in the presence of bank size and macroeconomic shocks. They also 
found that alternative measures of bank size could give rise to differential impact on NPAs. In 
the ensuing section, we present the discussion on asset quality in Indian Banking in order to 
provide a setting for the empirical analysis of this study. 
 
V. ASSET QUALITY IN INDIAN BANKING  
The raising levels of defaults in Indian banking particularly after the incidence of global 
financial crisis has become a matter of concern for the bankers as well as the policy makers and 
researchers. However, the Indian banking system has endured the stress of global financial crisis 
(largely because of its partial integration with global banking) as reflected in the improvement in 
the Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets Ratio (CRAR). The overall CRAR of all SCBs improved to 
13.2 per cent at end-March 2009, remaining considerably above the stipulated minimum of 9.0 
per cent. The gross NPAs to gross advances ratio remained unchanged at 2.3 per cent as at end-
March 2009 from its level as at end-March 2008. The ROA also remained unchanged at 1.0 per 
cent at end-March 2009 over its level at end-March 2008 indicating no deterioration in efficiency 
with which banks deployed their assets. The Return on Equity (ROE) increased to 13.3 per cent 
as at end-March 2009 from 12.5 per cent at end-March 2008, indicating increased efficiency with 
which capital was used by banks. In India, as in most other countries, NPAs
6
 are only an 
indicator of loan performance. The degree to which it measures actual performance of banks 
depends on the quality of accounting, auditing, regulation and supervision and the amount of 
                                                          
6 Non-Performing Asset (NPA) has been defined as a loan or an advance in respect of which payment of interest or principal or 
both has remained unpaid as per agreed terms of the loan contract for more than 90 days. The official definition of NPA in the 
Indian context is largely based on the loan repayment status. The distinguishing features of reporting of NPAs are in the 
terminology of Gross NPA (GNPA) and Net NPA (NNPA). Banks hold the bad loans even after making provisions in their books 
and continue to report as gross NPA. NNPA is the net value of the bad loan after deducting the available/marketable security and 
the appropriate provision from the gross NPA. 
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‘ever greening’ of weak loans, through restructuring, which is an incessant problem7 in India to 
judge from the numerous circulars against the practice which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
has issued against it over the last decade. Although NPAs have been substantially reduced since 
regulation was tightened in 1993, especially in the Public Sector Banks (PSBs), the momentum 
has recently slowed down and the levels of NPAs remain high compared to international 
standards (Refer Figure-2). He further argues that the problems of NPAs have a sizeable 
overhang component, arising from infirmities in the existing practices of debt recovery, 
inadequate legal provisions for foreclosure and bankruptcy and difficulties in the execution of 
court decrees. The problem is exacerbated by the regulatory provisions for loan classification 
vis-à-vis international best practices.  
Figure-2: Trends in Non-Performing Assets - Bank Group-wise 
 
                   Source: Compiled by Author based on data from RBI publications 
 
Although public sector banks have recorded improvements in profitability, efficiency (in 
terms of intermediation costs) and asset quality in the 1990s, they continue to have higher 
interest rate spreads but at the same time earn lower rates of return, reflecting higher operating 
costs. Bhattacharya (2001) rightly points to the fact that in an increasing rate regime, quality 
borrowers would switch over to other avenues such as capital markets, internal accruals for their 
                                                          
7 It is widely claimed in news reports that the figures of NPAs reported by different banks might be underestimated and might not 
reflect the true picture mostly due to the weak accounting practices, laxity and bias leading to improper classification with a 
motive to recognise higher revenue though not received, and disclosure measures, etc. 
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requirement of funds. Under such circumstances, banks would have no option but to dilute the 
quality of borrowers thereby increasing the probability of generation of NPAs.  
 
There are many internal and external factors affecting NPAs in India. While the internal 
factors might be taking up new projects, promoting associate concerns, time to cost overruns 
during the project implementation stage, business failure, inefficient management, strained 
labour relations, inappropriate technology/technical problems, product obsolescence etc., the 
external factors include GDP growth, default in other countries, high inflation, accidents and 
natural calamities. Further, it is observed that while there is a positive correlation between the 
factors such as GDP growth induce the bank credit, Procyclicality is observed in the case of 
comparison of Gross Domestic Product growth to NPA levels (Figure-3 and Figure-4).   
 
Figure-3: Comparison of Gross Domestic Product to Bank Credit in India 
 
Source: Compiled by Author based on data from RBI publications 
 
Figure-4: Procyclicality of NPAs: 
Comparison of Gross Domestic Product to Gross NPA level – Indian banking 
 
Source: Compiled by Author based on data from RBI publications 
 
Bank Profitability 
 
 Determinants of profitability in the banking sector have been a subject research quite 
often in the recent past. The importance of bank profitability can be assessed at the micro and 
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macro levels of the economy. The stability of the banking sector is closely related to the 
profitability of the sector, which is significant for a sound capital structure. The 2008 global 
financial crisis has shown that a banking sector having problems with profitability and capital 
structure may have a devastating effect to the economy as such a banking sector will not be able 
to generate credit for the economy. In this section, an investigation into the bank specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of profitability for participation banks in Turkish banking sector. 
Although the determinants of profitability in commercial banks has been a subject of research in 
a number of papers there is a need for research regarding the profitability of  banking system that 
are distinct from those which have experienced crisis quite often.. 
 
 At the micro level, profit is the essential prerequisite of a competitive banking 
institution and the cheapest source of funds. It is not merely a result, but also a necessity for 
successful banking in a period of growing competition on financial markets. Therefore, the basic 
object of a bank’s management is to achieve a profit, as the essential requirement for conducting 
any business. At the macro level, a sound and profitable banking sector is better able to 
withstand negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system. The importance 
of bank profitability at both the micro and macro levels has made researchers, academics, bank 
managements and bank regulatory authorities to develop considerable interest on the factors that 
determine bank profitability (Athanasoglou et al., 2005: 5). Bourke (1989) examined the internal 
and external determinants of profitability for the banks of twelve countries from Europe, North 
America, and Australia and observed that banks with a high degree of market power tend to 
exhibit risk avoidance behavior. Several studies demonstrate the existence of a significant 
relation between the business cycle and bank profitability. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) 
were among the first to relate bank profits to macro-economic indicators such as real GDP per 
capita. Based on aggregate data of the banking sector in a number of OECD countries, Bikker 
and Hu (2002) estimate the relation between bank profitability and real GDP growth. More 
recently, Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) report a significant relation between real GDP 
growth and bank profitability. Athanasoglou et al. (2008) find a positive relation between the 
output gap and the profitability of a panel of Greek banks. 
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 Moulyneux and Thornton (1992) investigate the determinants of profitability in the 
banking sector for eighteen European countries and find no evidence of risk avoidance 
hypothesis. Berger (1995) observes that there is a positive relationship between higher capital 
and higher earnings for U.S. banks in the 1980s but this structure had turned to negative 1990s. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) investigate the determinants of commercial bank interest 
margins and profitability for 80 countries during the period 1988-1995. Athanasoglou, Brissimis 
and Delis (2005) analyze the determinants of profitability for Greek banks for the 1985-2001 
period. They observe that increased exposure to credit risk has a negative impact on profitability 
whereas labor productivity growth has a positive effect on bank profits. They also observed that 
business cycle has a positive but asymmetric effect on profits. Flamini, McDonald and 
Schumacher (2009) investigate the determinants of commercial bank profitability in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. They observe that larger bank size, activity diversification, and private ownership are 
associated with higher profitability. In terms of macroeconomic variables, low inflation and 
stable output growth improve profitability indicators. 
 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) investigate the intersection of the problem loan literature 
and the cost efficiency literature in order to understand loan quality and efficiency. They note 
that, at first glance, there would appear to be little or no relationship since operations and lending 
are conducted in different areas of the bank by different personnel. However, the quality of 
senior management provides one link because banks that are poorly managed may be both cost 
inefficient and have higher levels of problem loans than other banks. Cole, et al (2004) and 
others found that small banks focus on different types of customers than large firms and evaluate 
credit in different ways. Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge (2004) and Carter and McNulty (2005) 
suggest that monitoring may contribute positively to small bank financial performance because 
risk-adjusted loan yields and spreads are greater for small banks. They point out that one 
explanation for the positive relation between monitoring and performance is the ability of small 
banks to find economically valuable information about a firm’s financial condition by 
monitoring the firm’s demand deposit account. There is not a large empirical literature on the 
relationship between bank profit efficiency and market value. One study (Aggarwal, Akhigbe, & 
McNulty, 2006) that deals only with banks involved in mergers finds that these two measures are 
positively related. Kaya (2002) investigating the determinants of profitability for Turkish 
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banking sector for the 1997-2000 period observes that capital, liquidity, personnel expenditures, 
loans, non-performing loans and deposits are the bank specific determinants of profitability. 
NPAs assume significance in determining the level of profitability, as we are well aware of the 
relationship between loan losses and loss of income. 
 
VI. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
 
In this section, we would introduce the methodology and the data source adopted for the 
empirical analysis. Accordingly, there is a need to estimate a relationship of the following form 
using the panel data consisting of different groups of banks in Indian Banking industry
8
 (such as 
State Bank Group, Nationalised Banks, Old Private Banks, New Private Banks and Foreign 
Banks) data across a period from March 1997 to March 2009. The choice of the period is 
dictated by several considerations. The first is the availability of published data on the variables 
considered in the study. Secondly, the year 1996-97 marks the rigorous regime of the prudential 
norms as a result of the ‘first generation’ reforms programme initiated in 1991, so that it would 
be useful to examine the impact of various determinants and the behaviour of different banking 
sector in terms of NPAs through the initiation of the reform process.  Further, the said period 
covers the significant period of post-liberalisation in Indian banking. The period chosen is upto 
March 2009 and not beyond in order to avoid the sudden devastating effect of the global 
financial crisis and is not before March 1997 as the effect of liberalisation and various financial 
sector reforms could well establish by this year (financial sector reforms were initiated in 1991-
92).  
The data for the empirical analysis has been sourced from the robust database of RBI and 
from the various publications of RBI (more particularly the annual reports on Trend and Progress 
of Banking in India and Statistical tables relating to banks in India) and also from the published 
annual audited accounts of individual banks. Several appropriate and relevant variables were 
identified in the backdrop of the theoretical considerations deliberated in the earlier section of 
this paper. The description of the variables and the related explanation is captured in Appendix-
                                                          
8
 State Bank group (SB) includes the prominent State Bank of India and its subsidiary banks, Nationalised Banks group includes 
all other public sector banks excluding SB group. SB group and NB group adding together constitute the public sector banks in 
Indian banking. Private sector banks are grouped as Old Private banks (OP) which have been in existence for a long time well 
before the financial sector reforms and New Private banks (NP) are the new generation banks that have emerged after the reforms 
and are technology savvy coupled with professional modern managements. The last group constitutes the Foreign Banks (FB) 
that has a very feeble presence in the entire economies and is found only in metros scheming the creamy business of the 
economy. 
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1. The descriptive statistics of the variables employed in the econometric analysis are presented 
in Appendix-2. Further, correlation statistics for the variables employed in the analysis are 
presented in Appendix-3 with significance levels at 1% and 5% (two-tailed). The movement of 
determinant variables in panels of analyses are presented in Appendix-4a to 4d.  
 
 
Econometric approach 
 
Two models of analysis were designed (Model 1 and 2) in order to capture the effect of 
variables in different dimensions. Model 1a and 2a involve GDPGR as the control variable for 
macro-economic activity whereas IIPGR, INFLA, MCAP and LR replace the GDPGR in Model 
1b and 2b. Model 1a and 1b are studied employing the panel least squares method with a first 
difference estimator for the data with robust standard errors (Wooldridge example 10.6, p. 282). 
Following Baltagi and Chang (1994) (also described in Baltagi, 2005), a fixed effects GLS 
specification has been estimated assuming the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity in 
model 1a and 1b. Coef covariance method among the robust methods has been used to compute 
the coefficient standard errors. The covariance calculations are chosen to be robust under the 
assumption perhaps that of cross-section heteroskedasticity and the calculations are performed 
without the leading degree of freedom correction term. The observed R-squared and F-statistics 
are based on the difference between the residuals sums of squares from the estimated model, and 
the sums of squares from a single constant-only specification, not from a fixed-effect-only 
specification. Further, the observed Durbin-Watson stat is formed simply by computing the first-
order residual correlation on the stacked set of residuals. Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the 
explanatory variables were found to be on the expected lines. F-test of the joint significance of 
variables that are presently omitted from a panel or pool equation has been performed with the 
null hypothesis that the variables are are jointly irrelevant. Further, redundant variables test has 
been performed to ascertain the joint significance of the variables that are presently included in 
the panel equation and irrelevant variables are removed from from the model. Balanced panel 
data is employed for estimation by employing the EViews tools for detailed analysis. 
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Model specification 
The primer model that can be estimated using panel techniques can be written as 
 
Yit  = ƒ (Xit, ) + δi + γt + it  
 
With assumption of a linear conditional mean specification, we can write the specification as; 
Yit  = 𝛂 + Xit   + δi + γt + it  
Where Yit is the dependent variable, and Xit is a 𝒌-vector of regressors, and  it are the error 
terms for  i = 1, 2, ……… , M  cross-sectional units observed for dated periods t = 1, 2, … , T.  
The α parameter represents the overall constant in the model, while the δi  and γt  represent cross-
section or period specific effects (random or fixed). 
 
Determinants of NPAs 
 
The objective here is to identify and analyse the determinants of NPAs. The following 
specification is designed for a panel regression method.   
 
Then, the equation would be; 
GNPAit  = α + β1 GDPGRt + β2 ERt  + β3 MCAPt + β4 LRt + + β5 IIPGRt + 
                    + β6 INFLAt + β7 SVGRt + β8 ASSETit + β9 CARit + β10 CDRit + β11 COFit +   
+ β12 ROAit +  β13RUSUBRAit  + β14  CREDGRit  + β15 PSCit  + β16 OERit  
+ β17 ROIit  + δi + γt + it  
 
The vector of regressors include both the macroeconomic and the endogenous (industry specific) 
variables that are assumed to determine the level of NPAs. 
 
The explanatory variables are represented by the macro-economic variables such as 
Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate (GDPGR), Exchange Rates (ER), Market Capitalisation 
Growth Rate (MCAP), Bank Lending Rates (LR), Index of Industrial Production (IIPGR), 
Inflation rate (INFLA), Savings Growth Rate (SVGR). The endogenous variables among the 
explanatory variables are represented by bank assets (natural log) (ASSET), Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAR), Credit to Deposit Ratio (CDR), Cost of Funds (COF), Return on Assets (ROA), 
1 
3 
2 
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Ratio of Rural and Semi Urban Branches to total bank branches (RUSUBRA), Bank Credit 
growth (CREDGR), Ratio of Priority Sector Credit to total loans (PSC), Operating Expenses to 
total assets (OER), and Return on Investments (ROI) that are supposed to determine the NPAs in 
the Indian context. While ‘i’ represents the category of bank group, ‘t’ represents the year and  it 
represents the unexplained residual. This equation is estimated using panel regression analysis 
considering Gross NPA (GNPA), which is calculated as the ratio of Gross Non Performing 
Assets to Total Advances and as regressand. 
 
GDPGR is involved as a determinant in view of its all-pervading effect in the economy 
that may have a say in causing the NPAs. It controls for the macroeconomic conditions that 
owing to the business cycles in the economy have a significant role to play in causing defaults in 
loan repayments.  It is also because of the reasoning that as the GDP increases the amount of 
NPAs decrease. INFLA is considered as a macroeconomic determinant as it is one of the aspects 
related to Indian economy which affects the banks overall performance especially the level of 
NPAs in the banking system. This is because when RBI takes some steps related to interest rates 
to control inflation, the defaulters list also grows for the banks with the rising interest rates. 
Further, savings levels in an economy explain the savings propensity as well as the economic 
surpluses available which has a relation to the repayment capacity of the borrowers of the 
banking sector in general. In view of this, SVGR is considered as a determinant. Also, in a 
growing economy like India, capital markets attract a whole lot of investors as well stimulate the 
capital formation in the country which has a bearing on the performance of the organised 
industrial sector. In view of this logic, Bombay Stock Exchange Market Capitalisation Growth 
Rate (MCAP) is considered as a determinant.  
 
It is argued that Non Priority Sector is the prime contributor to the NPAs. To include this 
viewpoint in the study, bank assets (ASSET) is taken as control for whether the bigger banks are 
more vulnerable to the problem of NPAs than their smaller counterparts are. CAR was also 
considered as a determinant in view of the logic that the higher the capital of the banks the lower 
is the level of NPAs. It was also due to the fact that as capital base of the banks increases 
confidence of the bank also increases and gets reflected in their performance thus leading to 
effective recovery of bank loans and bringing down the level of NPAs. ROA is considered as an 
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endogenous determinant because of the fact that profitability of banks would have a close 
relation with its NPAs. It is obvious in general that the more profitable banks would have less 
NPAs. In order to capture the aggressiveness in lending activity of the banks that can lead to 
NPAs, CDR is considered as an endogenous variable. Cost of Funds for the banks cause 
significant strategic decisions in the area of bank lending. In order to account this argument, 
COF is also considered as a determinant. Growth in Bank Credit is also one of the factors that 
can determine the emergence of NPAs. In view of this, CREDGR is considered as one of the 
determinants. In the area of bank lending the lending rates play a significant part. The cheaper 
the rates the more is the recovery rate, the higher the rates the higher the defaults. In order to 
account this argument, LR is considered. Much of the operating expenses in the bank are 
believed to be towards employing the work force and related resources for credit deployment and 
recovery. Accordingly, OER is also considered as a variable. Proportion of rural and semi-urban 
bank branches (RUSUBRA) has been considered as a determinant to examine whether the 
location of banks i.e, rural and semi-urban areas matter in causing NPAs in banking. The more 
aggressive are the banks in their lending they may end up in pushing riskier loans and thereby 
end up in higher level of NPAs. However, there is a contention that as banks concentrates on 
credit management they may have developed expertise in managing the credit risk and hence 
may sometimes exhibit lower level of NPAs. Therefore, the role of lending aggressiveness in 
causing increase in NPAs is still hazy. Ratio of Priority Sector Credit to total bank lending (PSC) 
was included as a determinant in order to account for the argument that the Priority Sector Loans 
are responsible for the most number of defaults (Refer Figure-5). 
Figure-5: Priority Sector Loans to Total Bank Credit in India 
 
Source: Compiled by Author based on data from RBI publications 
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Panel regression estimation for analysing the determinants of asset quality is made with 
GNPA as dependent variable (proxy for asset quality). Models 1a and 1b are analysed with Panel 
Least Squares and model 2a and 2b are analysed by employing Panel Least Squares with Cross-
section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. Residuals of the specification are 
presented in Appendix-5. 
 
Bank profitability 
The objective here is to identify and analyse the determinants of bank profitability of foregoing 
analysis of NPAs. The following specification is designed for a panel regression method.   
Then, the specification for analysis would be; 
 
ROAit  = α + β1 GDPGRt + β2 ASSETit + β3 CARit + β4 CDRit + β5 COFit + β6 GNPAit 
         +  β7RUSUBRAit  + β8  ROADVit + β9 PSCit  + β10 OERit  + 
+ β11 ROIit  + β12 IDRit +  it     
 
Where, vector of regressors include both the macroeconomic and the endogenous (industry 
specific) variables that are assumed to determine the level of profitability. 
 
Similar specification is employed as furnished here below for determining explanatory factors 
for ROE as the dependent variable for profitability analysis.  
 
ROEit  = α + β1 GDPGRt + β2 ASSETit + β3 CARit + β4 CDRit + β5 COFit + β6 GNPAit 
         +  β7RUSUBRAit  + β8  ROADVit + β9 PSCit  + β10 OERit  + 
+ β11 ROIit  + β12 IDRit +  it     
 
The explanatory variables include GDPGR, ASSET, CAR, CDR, COF, GNPA, 
RUSUBRA,  ROADV, PSC, OER, ROI and IDR that are supposed to determine the profitability 
in a broader perspective in the Indian context. While ‘i’ represents the category of bank group, ‘t’ 
represents the year and  it represents the unexplained residual. This equation is estimated using 
panel regression analysis considering ROA and ROE as regressand. 
 
4 
5 
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GDPGR is involved as a determinant in view of its all-pervading effect in the economy 
that may have a say in affecting the profitability. It controls for the macroeconomic conditions 
that owing to the business cycles in the economy have a significant role to play in causing 
defaults in loan repayments and revenues.  It is also because of the reasoning that as the GDP 
increases the profitability also increases. As size of the banking firm matters in profitability, 
bank asset (ASSET) is taken as control for whether the bigger banks have advantages in terms 
profitability than their smaller counterparts. CAR was also considered as a determinant in view 
of the logic that the higher the capital of the banks the higher would be the profitability. It was 
also due to the fact that as capital base of the banks increases confidence of the bank also 
increases and gets reflected in their performance thus leading to effective recovery of bank loans 
and bringing down the level of NPAs. In order to capture the aggressiveness in lending activity 
of the banks that can lead to boosting of interest income, CDR is considered as an endogenous 
variable. COF for the banks causes significant strategic decisions in the area of bank lending and 
affects the profitability.  
 
As the NPAs rise, there would be a dampening effect on the profitability and in order to 
understand the impact of NPAs, GNPA is included as a predictor variable. Much of the operating 
expenses in the bank are believed to be towards employing the work force and related resources 
for credit deployment and recovery. Accordingly, OER is also considered as a variable. 
Proportion of rural and semi-urban bank branches (RUSUBRA) has been considered as a 
determinant to examine whether the location of banks i.e, rural and semi-urban areas matter in 
causing NPAs in banking. The more aggressive are the banks in their lending they may end up in 
pushing riskier loans and thereby end up in higher level of NPAs. However, there is a contention 
that as banks concentrates on credit management they may have developed expertise in 
managing the credit risk and hence may sometimes exhibit lower level of NPAs. Therefore, the 
role of lending aggressiveness in causing increase in NPAs is still hazy. Ratio of Priority Sector 
Credit to total bank lending (PSC) was included as a determinant in order to account for the 
argument that the Priority Sector Loans are responsible for the most number of defaults. As the 
return on investments (excluding the loans and advances) increases, the profitability gets 
positively affected and as such, ROI is considered as a variable. Lastly, investment to deposit 
ratio (IDR) is also considered in order to control for the impact of deposit vis-à-vis investment 
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activity on bank profitability. Panel regression estimation for analysing the determinants of 
profitability is made with ROA and ROE as dependent variables as proxy for profitability. Model 
1 is analysed with Panel Least Squares and model 2 is analysed by employing Panel Least 
Squares with Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance. Residuals of the 
analysis are presented in appendix-6. 
 
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the analysis for determinants of asset quality is presented in Table-5 and 
the nature and strength of the impact of macroeconomic and endogenous determinants on NPAs 
are furnished in Table-6 for ready comprehension. Under both models, GDPGR is found to be 
negatively significant at 5 % and 1% levels respectively. COF is found to have a significant 
negative relationship at 1% significance level. The coefficient of CREDGR has turned out to be 
negative and significant at 5% level indicating that banks with higher credit growth may have 
better risk management procedures and technology, which definitely allows them to end up with 
lower levels of NPAs. It was also observed that CDR is negatively associated with bad loans 
signifying that higher the CDR the lower tends to be the level of NPAs. As an alternative macro-
economic variable, we employed the Index of Industrial Production (IIPGR) instead of GDPGR 
in Model-1b. The results indicate that the coefficient on this variable is negatively significant as 
conjectured at 1% level of significance. Further, as another variant of the aforesaid specification, 
we introduce the market capitalisation ratio (MCAP) in Model-1b with a view to capture the 
transition from a bank based to market based financial system. The result shows that the 
coefficient is positively significant at 1% level implying that transition to market orientation has 
impinged on the problem loans, as the surpluses tend to move into the booming markets as 
investments and thereby affecting the repayments of bank loans. 
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Table-5: Results of Panel Least Squares Regression for Determinants of NPAs 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Model-1a Model-1b Model-2a Model-2b 
Method Panel Least Squares 
Panel Least Squares with Cross-section 
weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance 
Constant 
0.06 
9.53 
0.41 
-10.0 
0.02 
9.23** 
0.49 
-6.11 
COF 
0.02 
-2.82** 
0.001 
-6.85*** 
0.005 
-2.82*** 
0.0001 
-6.85*** 
CREDGR 
0.29 
-0.33 
0.04 
-1.56** 
0.17 
-0.33 
0.02 
-1.56** 
ER -- 
0.66 
-0.20 
-- 
0.58 
-0.20 
GDPGR 
0.015 
-1.61** 
-- 
0.006 
-1.6*** 
-- 
IIPGR -- 
0.0003 
-3.78*** 
-- 
0.0000 
-3.7*** 
INFLA -- 
0.048 
4.02** 
-- 
0.01 
4.02** 
LR -- 
0.12 
7.55 
-- 
0.03 
7.55** 
MCAP -- 
0.03 
0.77** 
-- 
0.004 
0.77*** 
OER 
0.000 
3.48*** 
0.0006 
3.49*** 
0.0000 
3.48*** 
0.0000 
3.49*** 
PSC 
0.30 
0.69 
0.76 
0.22 
0.14 
0.69 
0.68 
0.22 
ROI 
0.005 
4.88*** 
0.0006 
6.37*** 
0.0008 
4.88*** 
0.0001 
6.37*** 
RUSUBRA 
0.053 
1.03 
0.98 
-0.01 
0.019 
1.03** 
0.97 
-0.01 
SVGR 
0.48 
-0.19 
-- 
0.42 
-0.19 
-- 
SBdummy 
0.39 
0.73 
0.03 
6.57** 
0.82 
0.42 
0.01 
2.68** 
NBdummy 
0.95 
0.05 
0.03 
6.18** 
0.88 
-0.24 
0.02 
2.29** 
OPdummy 
0.57 
-1.23 
0.13 
4.19 
0.49 
-1.23 
0.04 
4.19** 
NPdummy 
0.86 
-0.30 
0.09 
3.89 
0.10 
-0.93 
0.02 
-3.89** 
FBdummy 
0.86 
0.30 
0.096 
3.89 
0.83 
-0.30 
0.22 
3.8 
R Square 0.84 0.88 0.84 0.88 
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Adjusted R 
Square 
0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Note: 1. Dependent variable: GNPA  
   2. *** at 1% level of significance * * at less than 5% level of significance  
3. Coefficient values are marked with significance levels and the first row of results indicates the probability 
   values. 
Though LR under model-1b is found to be insignificant but is found to significant at 5 % level in 
model 2-b. While OER and ROI are found to be significant at 1% level in both the variants of 
models 1 and 2, interestingly, PSC and SVGR are found to be insignificant in both the models of 
analysis. As is theoretically well established when the ROI has increased, it is resulting in lesser 
amount of problem loans. Accordingly, the analysis has found that ROA is strongly associated 
with the NPAs negatively. Cost of Funds (COF) was found to be significantly associated with the 
NPAs negatively to evidence our viewpoint that as the cost of funds increase the banks tend to be 
very cautious and choosy in their lending thus leading to decrease in NPAs. Lending Rates have 
been found to be not so significant in affecting the NPAs contrary to the general perception. The 
rest of the explanatory variables exhibit theoretically expected relationships with NPAs and are 
self-explanatory as detailed in the columns 1 and 2 of Table-6 which explains the nature and 
strength of the impact of endogenous determinants on NPAs. 
Table-6: Nature and Strength of the Impact of determinants on NPAs 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model-1 Model-2 
COF Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
CREDGR Not Significant Negative and Significant 
ER Not Significant Not Significant 
GDPGR Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
IIPGR Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
INFLA Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
LR Not Significant Positive and Significant 
MCAP Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
OER Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
PSC Not Significant Not Significant 
ROI Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
RUSUBRA Not Significant Positive and Significant 
SVGR Not Significant Not Significant 
SBdummy Significant Positive and Significant 
NBdummy Significant Positive and Significant 
OPdummy Not Significant Positive and Significant 
NPdummy Not Significant Negative and Significant 
FBdummy Not Significant Not Significant 
   Note: Significance levels for the analysis is assumed at 1% and 5% considering the dynamics of the  
impacting variables   
  Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
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The last focus of interest in this study was whether the NPAs are in any way affected by 
the ownership styles of the banks. This issue was investigated by introducing the ownership 
dummies (SBdummy for State Bank Group of banks, NBdummy for Nationalised Banks, 
OPdummy for Old Private Banks, NPdummy for New Private Banks and FBdummy for Foreign 
Banks. The results summarized in Table-5 indicate that Private Banks (both Old and New) and 
Foreign Banks appear to manage their NPAs efficiently. State Bank Group and Nationalised 
Banks appear to lag behind their private counter parts in NPA management.  
 
The results of the analysis for determinants of profitability are presented in Table-7 and 
the nature and strength of the impact of macroeconomic and endogenous determinants on NPAs 
are furnished in Table-8 for ready comprehension.  
 
Table-7: Results of panel regression analysis of determinants of profitability 
Explanatory 
Variables 
ROA ROE ROA ROE 
 Panel Least Squares 
Panel Least Squares with 
Cross-section weights (PCSE) 
standard errors & covariance 
Constant 
0.79 
-3.15 
0.32 
-3.71 
0.96 
-0.44 
0.007 
-4.94 
ASSET 
0.26 
0.34 
0.24 
0.09 
0.17 
0.34 
0.14 
0.09 
CAR 
0.005 
2.44** 
0.0003 
1.25*** 
0.006 
2.44*** 
0.0000 
1.26*** 
CDR 
0.39 
-1.41 
0.69 
-0.20 
0.29 
-1.41 
-- 
COF 
0.07 
-1.43* 
0.18 
-0.29 
0.02 
-1.43** 
0.06 
-0.31* 
GDPGR 
0.47 
-.027 
0.89 
-0.01 
0.40 
-0.27 
0.97 
-0.003 
GNPA 
0.07 
-0.14* 
0.16 
-0.03 
0.012 
-0.14** 
0.06 
-0.03* 
IDR 
0.03 
2.13** 
0.91 
0.03 
0.02 
2.13** 
0.75 
0.05 
OER 
0.72 
-0.21 
0.01 
-0.47** 
0.59 
-0.21 
0.008 
-0.44*** 
PSC 
0.29 
-0.40 
0.30 
-0.12 
0.22 
-0.40 
0.17 
-0.12 
ROADV 
0.30 
0.74 
0.02 
0.28** 
0.11 
0.74 
0.07 
0.30* 
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ROI 
0.02 
2.63** 
0.09 
0.59* 
0.02 
2.63** 
0.01 
0.65*** 
RUSUBRA 
0.79 
-0.08 
0.65 
-0.03 
0.67 
-0.08 
-- 
SBdummy 
0.002 
2.18*** 
0.15 
0.30 
0.53 
-0.52 
0.04 
0.31** 
NBdummy 
0.02 
1.77** 
0.73 
0.08 
0.26 
-0.93 
0.52 
0.11 
OPdummy 
0.11 
-2.24 
0.43 
0.15 
0.03 
-2.24 
0.05 
0.18** 
NPdummy 
0.01 
-2.70** 
0.86 
-0.30 
0.0002 
-2.70*** 
0.02 
0.18** 
FBdummy 
0.01 
2.7** 
0.74 
-0.08 
0.41 
0.45 
0.99 
-0.0001 
R Square 0.84 0.66 0.84 0.66 
Adjusted R 
Square 
0.77 0.54 0.77 0.55 
Note:  1. Dependent variables: ROA and ROE   
   2. *** at 1% level of significance * * at less than 5% level of significance   * at less than 10% level of significance 
3. Coefficient values are marked with significance levels and the first row of results indicates the probability values. 
Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
 
  Under both models, COF is found to have a significant negative relationship at 1% 
significance level. Similar is the case with CAR, which is positively significant at 1% level in 
both the models of analysis. IDR is also observed to be negatively significant at 5% level. OER 
is found to be negatively significant at 5% and 1% levels of significance. ROI is significant at 
5% and 1% levels in both the models of analysis. Asset size, CDR, GDPGR, PSC, RUSUBRA 
are found not to have insignificant impact on profitability.  
 
Table-6: Nature and strength of the impact of determinants of profitability 
Explanatory 
Variable 
ROA ROE 
ASSET Not Significant Not Significant 
CAR Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
CDR Not Significant Not Significant 
COF Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
GDPGR Not Significant Not Significant 
GNPA Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
IDR Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
OER Negative and Significant Negative and Significant 
PSC Not Significant Not Significant 
ROADV Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
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ROI Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
RUSUBRA Not Significant Not Significant 
SVGR Not Significant Not Significant 
SBdummy Positive and Significant Positive and Significant 
NBdummy Positive and Significant Positive  
OPdummy Not Significant Positive and Significant 
NPdummy Not Significant Negative and Significant 
FBdummy Significant Not Significant 
   Note: Significance levels for the analysis is assumed at 1% and 5% considering the dynamics of the  
impacting vbariables   
   Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
 
Finally, one of the corollary objectives of this study was whether the profitability is in 
any way affected by the ownership styles of the banks. This issue was investigated by 
introducing the ownership dummies (SBdummy for State Bank Group of banks, NBdummy for 
Nationalised Banks, OPdummy for Old Private Banks, NPdummy for New Private Banks and 
FBdummy for Foreign Banks. The results summarized in Table-7 indicate that Private Banks 
(both Old and New) appear to manage their profitability efficiently. State Bank Group and 
Nationalised Banks appear to lag behind their private counter parts in profitability management. 
 
Robustness Checks 
 
In order to ascertain whether or not the empirical results presented above are robust, two 
routes were explored. Firstly, the robustness of the results with respect to the presence of outliers 
was investigated and the main results were not found to be driven by outliers. Secondly, the 
robustness of the above results to various specifications was investigated by various iterations of 
regression analysis. Variables included in the above specifications were excluded one by one and 
combinations of them and the final results presented are found robust to those modifications after 
duly considering the potential biases resulting from the omitted variables. Further in order to 
ensure the non-stationarity of the data panel-based unit roots were estimated as the rrecent 
literature suggests that panel-based unit root tests have higher power than unit root tests based on 
individual time series. 
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Several policy implications can be garnered from this analysis. Favourable 
macroeconomic conditions facilitate in NPA management leading to better asset quality. First, as 
the banks grow in size, they tend to control the NPA owing to efficiency in their management. In 
this background, there is a case for consolidation of banks in the public sector to reap this 
potential of efficiency in scale of operations. Larger banks have exhibited better credit risk 
management with lower NPA levels. Secondly, Priority Sector lending by banks is found to be 
not much significant in contributing for NPAs in contrast to the perception of some urban 
bankers that PSL cause NPAs. This supports the contention that branch expansion in rural and 
semi urban areas for extending priority sector credit is a viable proposition and there need not be 
aversion on this by the policy makers as well as the industry heads. Thirdly, Ownership of banks 
is an interesting issue that has been quite often debated. This study has established that private 
banks and foreign banks have advantages in terms of their efficiencies in better credit 
management in containing the NPAs, which indicates that bank privatization can lead to better 
management of default risk. These findings infer that better credit risk management practices 
need to be taken up for bank lending. Adequate attention should be paid to those banks with low 
operating efficiency and low capitalisation as also to macroeconomic cycles that appear to be 
playing some role in NPA management. The state owned banks need to be toned up with 
adequate measures to sharpen their NPA management practices. These findings assume crucial 
importance in view of the significance. It is summarised that Private Banks (both Old and New) 
and Foreign Banks appear to manage their NPAs efficiently. State Bank Group and Nationalised 
Banks appear to lag behind their private counter parts in NPA management. 
 
Investigating the industry specific and macroeconomic determinants of profitability for 
commercial banks in India, it is observed that capital adequacy is positively influencing the 
profitability. It can be inferred that capital infusion though comes with a cost, on other hand, is 
beneficial in improving the profitability. It is interesting to note that since majority of the banks 
being domestic oriented banks, return on advances has a positive causative relationship on 
profitability. Similar is the case with investment activity. On the impact of ownership styles, it is 
observed that Private Banks (both Old and New) appear to manage their profitability efficiently. 
State Bank Group and Nationalised Banks appear to lag behind their private counter parts in 
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profitability management. These results contribute to the existing literature particularly in the 
context of emerging economies by providing new understanding about the determinants of 
quality of assets and profitability of banks.  
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Appendix-1: Description of Variables 
Variable Empirical Definition and explanation 
ASSET 
Size of the bank is represented by the total asset of the bank (natural log) and is 
expected to have a positive effect on profitability.   
CAR 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (also called CRAR) is the ratio of the capital of the bank 
against its risk weighted assets. It is expected to have a positive effect on 
profitability. 
CDR 
Credit Deposit Ratio represents the ratio of the loans outstanding vis-à-vis deposits 
outstanding in a bank. Very high CDR indicates the aggressive lending activity of the 
bank and is predicted to have a positive effect on the NPA levels and negative effect 
on the profitability as increasing NPA levels lead to non-realisation of income by the 
bank. 
COF 
Cost of Funds in percentage is the cost incurred by the bank in raising its funds for 
banking business in which cost of deposits constitutes a major chunk. It is expected 
to negatively affect the NPAs as the rising cost of funds compels the bank to 
selectively go for quality credit deployment and hectic recovery measures. Further, it 
would negatively on the profitability, as the increase in cost of funds would drain 
away the margin for the bank.  
CREDGR 
Bank Credit Growth Rate (Growth in real advances) is measured in percentage and is 
expected to negatively affect the NPAs and positively influence the income of the 
bank. 
ER 
Exchange rate levels are expressed by the trend in the exchange of domestic currency 
vis-à-vis US Dollar widely considered as the global anchor currency. It is expected 
that as the exchange rate for Dollar increases, the domestic currency depreciates 
leading the unhealthy scenario on many fronts in the economy and hence it is 
predicted to impact on the banking industry too. 
GDPGR 
Growth Rate of real Gross Domestic Product (measured in percentage growth) is the 
variable that controls for the impact of macroeconomic activity on the banking 
industry. It is expected to have a negative effect of the NPAs and on the other hand 
positively affect the profitability of the bank.   
GNPA 
Gross NPA to Total Advances is a broad measure of non-performing bank assets. 
The higher the ratio the higher is the loss of profitability for the bank and speaks low 
about the bank’s efficiency in credit management. It is expected to have a significant 
negative impact on the profitability. 
IDR 
Investment to Deposit Ratio explains the level of Investments as against the Deposit 
levels of the bank and is expected to have a positive impact on profitability and 
negative impact on the NPA levels.  
IIPGR 
Index of Industrial Production (IIP), measured in percentage annual growth of 
industrial production in the economy is expected to have a significant effect on the 
NPAs. 
INFLA 
Inflation levels measured in annual growth of whole sale price index in the economy 
is expected to have a positive and significant impact on the NPAs    
LR 
Bank Lending Rates measured in percentage are expected to positively affect the 
NPA levels as the rising loan rates would lead to defaults thereby causing NPAs. 
MCAP 
Market capitalisation of Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) is considered as a proxy for 
the market activity and its sentiments in the Indian industry. For the purpose of this 
analysis, the annual growth in the market capitalisation is considered and is expected 
to positively affect the profitability and negatively impact on the NPA levels. 
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OER 
Operating Expenses to Total Assets is expressed in ratio and is predicted to 
negatively impact the profitability of the banks as the reduction in operating costs 
would lead to rise in net profit. 
PSC 
Priority Sector Credit to Total Loans is measured in ratio and is expected to 
positively impact on the NPA levels as per popular perception of the banking 
industry and negatively impact on the profitability. 
ROA 
Return On Assets of banks is measured in ratio and is considered an accounting 
measure of the profitability of a firm. It is expected to have negative relationship 
with NPA levels.  
ROADV 
Return On Advances is an accounting ratio measured with the amount of income 
generated by the lending activity of the bank (income by loans). Obviously it is 
expected to have a positive effect on profitability 
ROE 
Return On Equity of banks is measured in ratio and is considered an accounting 
measure of profitability of a firm. Similar to ROA it is also expected to have negative 
relationship with profitability of the bank. 
ROI 
Return on Investment is measured as the percentage of income earned by the bank 
out of its investment (mostly in market and off-market investment portfolios) other 
than loans and advances. Higher the ROI, the higher is the positive impact on 
profitability.    
RUSUBRA 
Ratio of number of Rural and Semi-Urban branches to total bank branches is 
expressed in ratio. It is generally believed that increase in this ratio would positively 
affect the NPA levels and negatively affect the profitability. 
SVGR 
Savings Growth Rate is expressed in ratio and represents the level of savings activity 
in the economy. The role of this variable in this analysis is to control for the effects 
of savings activity in the economy on the banking industry.  
  Source: Compiled from the results of the analysis by author 
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Appendix-2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
  
Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
ASSET 25000.00 2314102.00 429639.83 466356.88 2.01 4.55 
CAR 10.10 15.20 12.49 1.27 0.04 -0.17 
CDR 45.24 87.18 65.28 13.00 -0.07 -1.47 
COF 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 1.35 1.88 
CREDGR 0.74 71.04 20.78 10.96 1.57 5.79 
ER 0.09 0.43 0.28 0.09 -0.20 -0.76 
GDPGR 3.80 9.60 6.98 1.90 -0.29 -1.15 
GNPA 1.70 19.05 6.80 4.71 0.82 -0.46 
IDR 33.29 60.42 45.06 7.25 0.42 -0.51 
IIPGR 2.80 11.50 6.81 2.16 0.19 0.16 
INFLA 3.70 9.30 5.76 1.50 0.56 0.26 
LR 10.75 18.00 14.23 1.81 -0.08 -0.64 
MCAP -0.37 1.10 0.29 0.40 0.37 -0.48 
OER 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 1.35 1.88 
PSC 8.31 47.69 28.80 8.52 0.09 -0.41 
ROA 0.10 8.20 1.11 0.99 5.98 42.49 
ROADV 3.65 17.12 10.62 2.72 0.26 0.26 
ROE 6.25 23.20 14.80 3.50 -0.26 0.49 
ROI 5.70 12.66 9.40 2.23 -0.02 -1.55 
RUSUBRA 0.00 0.74 0.39 0.27 -0.27 -1.53 
SAVGR 0.03 0.27 0.16 0.07 -0.39 -1.13 
 Source:  Author’s calculations for this study 
Note:  ASSET that describes the bank assets is denominated in INR crores. 
 All other variables are presented in ratios 
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Appendix-3: Correlations of Variables 
 GD 
PG 
R 
IN 
FL 
A 
CR 
ED 
GR 
PSC AS 
SET 
CDR ROA RU 
SU 
BR 
A 
GN 
PA 
CAR OER COF LR ROA RO 
AD 
V 
RO 
I 
ID 
R 
ROE FX 
GR 
II 
PG 
R 
SA 
VG 
R 
MC 
AP 
SV 
GR 
GDP 
GR 
1.0                       
IN 
FL 
A 
.08 1.0                      
CR 
ED 
GR 
.2* -0.1 1.0                     
PS 
C 
.2* 0.0 -0.1 1.0                    
AS 
SE 
T 
.3* -0.0 0.2 .4** 1.0                   
CD 
R 
.3** -.02 .4** -.2* 0.0 1.0                  
RO 
A 
0.1 .06 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0                 
RU 
SU 
BR 
A 
-.07 0.1 -0.2 .4** .2* -.7** -.2* 1.0                
GN 
PA 
-.4** 0.2 -.3** .04 -.2 -.8** -0.1 .5** 1.0               
CA 
R 
0.1 -0.1 -.02 .07 -.01 .3** .2* -0.1 -.3** 1.0              
OE 
R 
-0.1 0.2 -.3** .05 -0.1 -.3** 0.1 .03 .5** -.4** 1.0             
CO 
F 
-.4** .5** -.3** -0.2 -.3** -.4** -0.2 0.2 .5** -.2* 0.2 1.0            
LR 0.1 .5** -.09 -0.2 -.3** .4** 0.1 -.3** -.2* 0.1 -0.1 0.2 1.0           
Note:  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix-3 .. continued: Correlations of Variables 
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BR 
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CAR OER COF LR ROA RO 
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ID R ROE FX 
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II 
PG 
R 
SA 
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MC 
AP 
SV 
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ROA .07 .00 .03 .08 .3** 0.2 .3* -.1 -.2* 0.1 -.1 -.1 0.1 1.0          
RO 
AD 
V 
-.3** .6** -.3** -.3** -.5** -.1 .04 -.1 .3** -.2 .3** .7** .4** .0 1.0         
RO 
I 
-.5** .4** -.2* -.3* -.4** -.4** -.1 0.1 .6** -.3** .4** .8** -.03 -.2 .7** 1.0        
ID 
R 
-.4** -.4** -.1 -.3* -.4** -.1 .09 -.2* 0.1 .08 0.1 -0.1 -.3* -.06 0.0 0.1 1.0       
RO 
E 
.05 -.2 0.1 -.01 0.1 0.0 .09 .1 -.1 .4** -.5** -.07 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 -.09 .04 1.0      
FX 
GR 
.04 -.04 -.1 0.1 .2* 0.1 0.2 .06 -.21 .3** -.2* -.2 0.1 0.2 -.2 -.4** .02 .2* 1.0     
II 
PG 
R 
.6** .03 .2* .3** .3** .3** 0.1 -0.0 -.5** 0.2 -.2* -.5** 0.1 0.1 -.4** -.6** -.4** 0.1 .09 1.0    
SA 
VG 
R 
.3** -.5** 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 .06 -0.0 -.3** .2* -0.2 -.5** -.1 0.1 -.4** -.4** 0.0 .3** 0.1 .5** 1.0   
MC 
AP 
.5** -.4** 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 .09 -.07 -.3* 0.2 -.2 -.4** -.1 .13 -.4** -.4** -.01 .2* .06 .4** .8** 1.0  
SV 
GR 
.3** -.5** 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 .06 -.08 -.3** .2* -.2 -.5** -.1 0.2 -.4** -.4** .05 .3** 0.1 .5** 1.0** .8** 1.0 
Note:  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix-4a: Movement of variables in panels of analyses 
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Appendix-4b: Movement of variables in panels of analyses 
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Appendix-4c: Movement of variables in panels of analyses 
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Appendix-4d: Movement of variables in panels of analyses 
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Appendix-5: Chart of residuals - Analyses for determinants of bank asset quality  
 
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
 1
 -
 9
8
 1
 -
 0
0
 1
 -
 0
2
 1
 -
 0
4
 1
 -
 0
6
 1
 -
 0
8
 2
 -
 9
8
 2
 -
 0
0
 2
 -
 0
2
 2
 -
 0
4
 2
 -
 0
6
 2
 -
 0
8
 3
 -
 9
8
 3
 -
 0
0
 3
 -
 0
2
 3
 -
 0
4
 3
 -
 0
6
 3
 -
 0
8
 4
 -
 9
8
 4
 -
 0
0
 4
 -
 0
2
 4
 -
 0
4
 4
 -
 0
6
 4
 -
 0
8
 5
 -
 9
8
 5
 -
 0
0
 5
 -
 0
2
 5
 -
 0
4
 5
 -
 0
6
 5
 -
 0
8
Residual Actual Fitted
MODEL 1a
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
 1
 -
 9
8
 1
 -
 0
0
 1
 -
 0
2
 1
 -
 0
4
 1
 -
 0
6
 1
 -
 0
8
 2
 -
 9
8
 2
 -
 0
0
 2
 -
 0
2
 2
 -
 0
4
 2
 -
 0
6
 2
 -
 0
8
 3
 -
 9
8
 3
 -
 0
0
 3
 -
 0
2
 3
 -
 0
4
 3
 -
 0
6
 3
 -
 0
8
 4
 -
 9
8
 4
 -
 0
0
 4
 -
 0
2
 4
 -
 0
4
 4
 -
 0
6
 4
 -
 0
8
 5
 -
 9
8
 5
 -
 0
0
 5
 -
 0
2
 5
 -
 0
4
 5
 -
 0
6
 5
 -
 0
8
Residual Actual Fitted
MODEL 1b
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
 1
 -
 9
8
 1
 -
 0
0
 1
 -
 0
2
 1
 -
 0
4
 1
 -
 0
6
 1
 -
 0
8
 2
 -
 9
8
 2
 -
 0
0
 2
 -
 0
2
 2
 -
 0
4
 2
 -
 0
6
 2
 -
 0
8
 3
 -
 9
8
 3
 -
 0
0
 3
 -
 0
2
 3
 -
 0
4
 3
 -
 0
6
 3
 -
 0
8
 4
 -
 9
8
 4
 -
 0
0
 4
 -
 0
2
 4
 -
 0
4
 4
 -
 0
6
 4
 -
 0
8
 5
 -
 9
8
 5
 -
 0
0
 5
 -
 0
2
 5
 -
 0
4
 5
 -
 0
6
 5
 -
 0
8
Residual Actual Fitted
MODEL 2a
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
-8
-4
0
4
8
 1
 -
 9
8
 1
 -
 0
0
 1
 -
 0
2
 1
 -
 0
4
 1
 -
 0
6
 1
 -
 0
8
 2
 -
 9
8
 2
 -
 0
0
 2
 -
 0
2
 2
 -
 0
4
 2
 -
 0
6
 2
 -
 0
8
 3
 -
 9
8
 3
 -
 0
0
 3
 -
 0
2
 3
 -
 0
4
 3
 -
 0
6
 3
 -
 0
8
 4
 -
 9
8
 4
 -
 0
0
 4
 -
 0
2
 4
 -
 0
4
 4
 -
 0
6
 4
 -
 0
8
 5
 -
 9
8
 5
 -
 0
0
 5
 -
 0
2
 5
 -
 0
4
 5
 -
 0
6
 5
 -
 0
8
Residual Actual Fitted
MODEL 2b
 
 
 
Page 43 of 43 
 
 
Appendix-6: Chart of residuals - Analyses for determinants of Profitability 
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